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Abstract
This paper considers a linear Fisher market with n buyers
and a continuum of items. In order to compute market equi-
libria, we introduce (infinite-dimensional) convex programs
over Banach spaces, thereby generalizing the Eisenberg-Gale
convex program and its dual. Regarding the new convex
programs, we establish existence of optimal solutions, the
existence of KKT-type conditions, as well as strong dual-
ity. All these properties are established via non-standard ar-
guments, which circumvent the limitations of duality the-
ory in optimization over infinite-dimensional vector spaces.
Furthermore, we show that there exists a pure equilibrium
allocation, i.e., a division of the item space. Similar to
the finite-dimensional case, a market equilibrium under the
infinite-dimensional Fisher market is Pareto optimal, envy-
free and proportional. We also show how to obtain the (a.e.
unique) equilibrium price vector and a pure equilibrium al-
location from the (unique) n-dimensional equilibrium bang-
per-buck vector. When the item space is the unit interval
[0, 1] and buyers have piecewise linear utilities, we show that
-approximate equilibrium prices can be computed in time
polynomial in the market size and log 1

. This is achieved by
solving a finite-dimensional convex program using the ellip-
soid method. To this end, we give nontrivial and efficient sub-
gradient and separation oracles. For general buyer valuations,
we propose computing market equilibrium using stochastic
dual averaging, which finds an approximate equilibrium price
vector with high probability.
1 Introduction
Market equilibrium is a classical concept from economics,
where the goal is to find an allocation of a set of items to
a set of buyers, as well as corresponding prices, such that
the market clears. One of the simplest equilibrium models
is the (finite-dimensional) linear Fisher market. A Fisher
market consists of a set of n buyers and m divisible items,
where the utility for a buyer is linear in their allocation.
Each buyer i has a budget Bi and valuation vij for each
item j. A ME consists of an allocation (of items to buy-
ers) and prices (of items) such that (i) each buyer receives
a bundle of items that maximizes their utility subject to their
budget constraint, and (ii) the market clears (all items such
that pj > 0 are exactly allocated). In spite of its simplicity,
this model has several applications. Perhaps the most well-
known application is in the competitive equilibrium from
equal incomes (CEEI), where m items must be fairly di-
vided among n agents. By giving each agent one unit of
faux currency, the allocation from the resulting ME can
be used as the fair division. This approach guarantees sev-
eral fairness desiderata. Linear Fisher markets also have ap-
plications in large-scale ad markets (Conitzer et al. 2018;
2019) and fair recommender systems (Kroer et al. 2019;
Kroer and Peysakhovich 2019).
For the case of finite-dimensional linear Fisher mar-
kets, the Eisenberg-Gale convex program computes a mar-
ket equilibrium (Eisenberg and Gale 1959; Eisenberg 1961;
Jain and Vazirani 2010; 2010; Nisan et al. 2007; Cole et
al. 2017). However, in settings like Internet ad markets and
fair recommender systems, the number of items is often
huge (Kroer et al. 2019; Kroer and Peysakhovich 2019;
Balseiro, Besbes, and Weintraub 2015), if not infinite or
even uncountable. For example, each item can be character-
ized by a set of features, where features come from a com-
pact set in a Euclidean space. In order to capture this, we
study Fisher markets and ME for a continuum of items.
A problem closely related to our infinite-dimensional
Fisher-market setting is the cake-cutting or fair division
problem. There, the goal is to efficiently partition a “cake”
– often modeled as a compact measurable space, or sim-
ply the unit interval [0, 1] – among n agents so that certain
fairness and efficiency properties are satisfied (Weller 1985;
Brams and Taylor 1996; Cohler et al. 2011; Procaccia 2013;
Cohler et al. 2011; Brams et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2013;
Aziz and Ye 2014; Aziz and Mackenzie 2016; Legut 2017;
2020). See (Procaccia 2014) for a survey for the various
problem setups, algorithms and complexity results. Weller
(1985) shows the existence of a fair allocation, that is, a
measurable division of a measurable space satisfying weak
Pareto optimality and envy freeness. As will be seen shortly,
when all buyers have the same budget, our definition of
a pure ME, i.e., where the allocation consist of indicator
functions of a.e.-disjoint measurable sets, is in fact equiv-
alent to this notion of fair division, that is, a Pareto opti-
mal, envy-free division (also see, e.g., (Cohler et al. 2011;
Chen et al. 2013)). Additionally, we also give an explicit
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characterization of the unique equilibrium prices based on a
pure equilibrium allocation under arbitrary budgets, gener-
alizing the result of Weller (1985) for uniform budgets.
Under piecewise constant valuations over the cake [0, 1],
the equivalence of fair division and market equilibrium in
certain setups has been discovered and utilized in the design
of cake-cutting algorithms (Brams et al. 2012; Aziz and Ye
2014). Here, we extend this connection to arbitrary valua-
tions in the L1 function space: we propose Eisenberg-Gale-
type convex programs that characterize all ME (and hence
all fair divisions). As a concrete example, we show that we
can efficiently compute approximate equilibrium bang-per-
buck variables and prices under piecewise linear valuations,
partially addressing an open problem posed by Aziz and Ye
(2014). A recent related work is that of Legut (2017), which
proposes optimization formulations for “optimal” fair divi-
sion under linear utilities. This work considers optimality
and fairness notions that are different from the more com-
monly used one we adopt. Furthermore, the optimization
formulation is non-convex, and does not lead to market equi-
librium properties.
Summary of contributions. First, we propose a natu-
ral generalization of market equilibrium (ME) for a Fisher
market with n buyers and a continuum of items Θ. We then
give two infinite-dimensional convex programs over Banach
spaces of measurable functions on Θ ((1) and (2)), gener-
alizing the EG convex program and its dual for a finite-
dimensional Fisher market. For the new convex programs,
we first establish existence of optimal solutions (Lemma 1,
2 and 3). Due to the lack of a compatible constraint qualifi-
cation, general duality theory does not apply to these convex
programs. Instead, we establish various duality properties
directly through nonstandard arguments (Lemma 4). Based
on these duality properties and the existence of a minimizer
in the “primal” convex program (1), we show that an alloca-
tion and prices pair is a ME if and only if they are optimal
solutions to our convex programs (Theorem 2). Furthermore,
since (1) has a pure optimal solution (i.e., buyers get disjoint
measurable item subsets), there exists a pure equilibrium
allocation, i.e., a division (module zero-value item) of the
item space. Finally, we show that a ME under the infinite-
dimensional Fisher market satisfies (budget-weighted) pro-
portionality, Pareto optimality and envy-freeness. Our re-
sults on the existence of ME and its fairness properties can
be viewed as generalizations of those in (Weller 1985), in
which every buyer (agent) has the same budget. All results,
except the existence of a pure equilibrium allocation, hold
when the item space Θ is discrete (e.g., countably infinite).
When the item space is the unit interval [0, 1] and buyers
have piecewise linear utilities, we show that -approximate
equilibrium prices can be computed in time polynomial in
the market size and log 1 (Theorem 6). This is achieved
by solving a variation of our convex programs where the
infinitely-many items only occur in the objective, and show-
ing that the ellipsoid method can be applied. To this end, we
give nontrivial, efficient first-order and separation oracles.
Finally, using the same convex-program variation for more
general buyer valuations, we propose using the stochastic
dual averaging algorithm (SDA) and establish convergence
guarantees (Theorem 7).
2 Infinite-dimensional Fisher Markets
First we introduce the measure-theoretic concepts that we
will need. This paragraph can be skimmed and referred back
to later. The items will be represented by Θ, a compact sub-
set of Rd. Denote the Lebesgue measure on Rd as µ. LetM
be the set of real-valued (Borel) measurable functions on Θ.
Since Θ is compact, it is (Borel) measurable and µ(Θ) <∞.
Note that functions that are equal a.e. on Θ form an equiva-
lence class, which we treat as the same function. In fact, any
function f in this equivalence class give the same functional
g 7→ ∫ fgdµ. Meanwhile, for any Lebesgue measurable f
on Θ, there exists f˜ ∈ M such that f = f˜ a.e. The suffix
a.e. will be omitted unless the emphasis is necessary. For any
S ⊆ M, denote S+ = {f ∈ S : f ≥ 0}. For f, g ∈ M+,
denote 〈f, g〉 = ∫ fgdµ. This notation aligns with the usual
notation for bilinear form, i.e., applying a bounded linear
functional g ∈ X ∗ to f ∈ X . Let 1 be the constant func-
tion taking value 1 on Θ and 1A be the indicator function of
measurable A ⊆ Θ. For a cone P ⊆ X , denote its dual cone
as P∗ = {g ∈ X ∗ : 〈f, g〉 ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ X}. For q ∈ [1,∞],
let Lq(Θ) be the Banach space of Lq (integrable) functions
on Θ with the usual Lq norm. When q = ∞, the norm is
‖f‖ = inf{M > 0 : |f | ≤ M a.e.}. Any τ ∈ L1(Θ)+
can also be viewed as a measure on Θ via µτ (A) :=
∫
A
τdµ
for any measurable A ⊆ Θ. Here, τ is the Radon–Nikodym
derivative of µτ w.r.t. µ. We will denote µτ (A) simply as
τ(A) for a measurable A ⊆ Θ whenever there is no con-
fusion. In this work, any measure m used or constructed
is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure µ and
hence atomless: for any measurable set A ⊆ Θ such that
m(A) > 0 and any c ∈ (0,m(A)), there exists measur-
able B ⊆ A such that m(B) = Θ. Two measurable sets
A,B ⊆ Θ are a.e.-disjoint if µ(A ∩ B) = 0. We say that
{Θi} is a measurable partition of Θ if all Θi ⊂ Θ are mea-
surable and pairwise a.e.-disjoint. As is customary, we of-
ten use equations and inequalities of measurable functions
in M to denote the corresponding (measurable) preimages
in Θ. For example, {f ≤ 0} := {θ ∈ Θ : f(θ) ≤ 0} and
{f = 0} := {θ ∈ Θ : f(θ) = 0}.
Fisher market. There are n buyers and a compact con-
tinuum of items Θ ( Rd, as described above. Let valua-
tions and allocations V,X ⊆ M be Banach spaces. Un-
less otherwise stated, we assume V = L1(Θ) and X =
L∞(Θ). Each buyer has some valuation vi ∈ V+. The prices
p ∈ V+ live in the same space as valuations. An alloca-
tion of items to a buyer i is denoted by xi ∈ X+. We use
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn+ to denote the overall allocation.
An allocation x is said to be a pure allocation if for all i,
xi = 1Θi for a.e.-disjoint measurable Θi ⊆ Θ (where left-
over is possible, i.e., Θ \ (∪iΘi) 6= ∅). In this case, we also
denote x as {Θi}. An allocation is mixed if it is not pure, or
equivalently, {0 < xi < 1} has positive measure for some
i. Each buyer has a budget Bi > 0 and all items have unit
supply, i.e., x is supply-feasible if
∑
i xi ≤ 1. Without loss
of generality, we also assume that vi(Θ) = ‖vi‖ > 0 for all
i (otherwise buyer i can be removed).
Given prices p ∈ V+, the demand set of buyer i is
Di(p) = arg max {〈vi, xi〉 : x ∈ X+, 〈p, xi〉 ≤ Bi} .
Generalizing the finite-dimensional counterpart (Eisenberg
and Gale 1959; Eisenberg 1961; Jain and Vazirani 2007;
2010; Nisan et al. 2007), a market equilibrium is defined as
a pair (x∗, p∗) ∈ Xn+ × V+ satisfying the following.
• Buyer optimality: for every i ∈ [n], x∗i ∈ Di(p∗).
• Market clearance:
∑
i x
∗
i ≤ 1 and 〈p∗,1−
∑
i x
∗
i 〉 = 0.
We say that x∗ ∈ Xn+ is an equilibrium allocation if (x∗, p∗)
is a ME for some p∗ ∈ V+. A pair (x∗, p∗) is called a pure
ME if it is a ME and x∗ is a pure allocation. From the def-
inition of ME, we can assume vi(Θ) = 1 for all i w.l.o.g.
We can also assume ‖B‖1 =
∑
iBi = 1 w.l.o.g., since if
(x∗, p∗) is a ME under B = (Bi), then (x∗, p∗/‖B‖1) is a
ME under (Bi/‖B‖1).
3 Equilibrium and duality
Since infinite-dimensional convex duality does not allow us
to conclude strong duality, we cannot start with a convex
program and then derive its dual. Instead, we directly pro-
pose three convex programs, and then proceed to show from
first principles that a strong duality-like relationship holds.
First, we give a direct generalization of the Eisengerg-Gale
convex program (Eisenberg 1961; Nisan et al. 2007):
z∗ = sup
x∈Xn+
∑
i
Bi log〈vi, xi〉 s.t.
∑
i
xi ≤ 1. (1)
First, we show the existence of an optimal (pure) solution
attaining the supremum z∗. Unlike the finite-dimensional
case, the feasible region of (1) here, although being closed
and bounded in the Banach space L∞(Θ), is not compact
(an infinite sequence of feasible x(k) without a converging
subsequence can easily be constructed).
Lemma 1. The supremum z∗ in (1) is attained at some x∗
such that x∗i = 1Θi , where {Θi} are disjoint measurable
subsets of Θ (can also require partition, i.e., ∪iΘi = Θ).
Motivated by the dual of the finite-dimensional EG con-
vex program (Cole et al. 2017, Lemma 3), we also consider
the following convex program:
w∗ = inf
p∈V+, β∈Rn+
[
〈p,1〉 −
∑
i
Bi log βi
]
s.t. p ≥ βivi a.e.,∀ i.
(2)
For a fixed β > 0, intuitively, we should set p =
maxi βivi. The following lemma ensures that this choice is
well-defined.
Lemma 2. When V = Lq(Θ) for q ∈ [1,∞], for any vi ∈
V+ and β ∈ Rn+, we have maxi βivi ∈ V+.
Thus we can consider the following finite-dimensional
convex program:
inf
β∈Rn+
[〈
max
i
βivi,1
〉
−
∑
i
Bi log βi
]
. (3)
Lemma 3. The minimum of problem (3) is attained at a
unique minimizer β∗ > 0. The optimal solution (p∗, β∗) of
(2) is also (a.e.) unique and satisfies p∗ = maxi β∗i vi.
Remark. Here, our approach is to first define a pair of
convex programs (1) and (2), and then show that they exhibit
various duality properties. Specifically, when (2) is viewed
as the “primal” and (1) the associated “dual”, conditions
(4) and (5) can be interpreted as first-order stationarity con-
ditions and (6) is the complementary slackness condition.
However, these properties cannot be concluded directly from
the general convex optimization duality theory in Banach
spaces (see, e.g., (Ponstein 2004, §3) and (Luenberger 1997,
§8.6)). For example, if we view (2) as the primal, then its
dual is (1) and weak duality follows. However, we cannot
conclude strong duality, or even primal or dual optimum at-
tainment, since V+ has an empty interior (Luenberger 1997,
§8.8 Problem 1) and hence Slater’s condition does not hold.
If we choose V+ = L∞(Θ) instead of L1(Θ), then (2) sat-
isfies Slater’s condition (Luenberger 1997, §8.8 Problem 2).
However, its dual is (1) with the cone X+ replaced by the
(much larger) cone {g ∈ L∞(Θ)∗ : 〈f, g〉 ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈
L∞(Θ)+} ⊆ L∞(Θ)∗. In this case, not every bounded lin-
ear functional g ∈ L∞(Θ) can be represented by a measur-
able function g˜ ∈ M such that 〈f, g〉 = ∫ g˜fdµ. Therefore,
we cannot conclude that (1) has an optimal solution in Xn+
satisfying strong duality. Similar dilemmas occur when (1)
is viewed as the primal instead.
Due to the above remark, we now establish weak duality
and necessary and sufficient conditions for strong duality di-
rectly. Our proofs of optimum attainment (Lemmas 1 and 3)
were necessary for the same reason.
Lemma 4. Let C = ‖B‖1 −
∑
iBi logBi. We have
• Weak duality: C + z∗ ≤ w∗.
• WhenC+z∗ = w∗ and z∗,w∗ are attained by x∗ feasible
to (1) and (p∗, β∗) feasible to (2), respectively, we have〈
p∗,1−
∑
i
x∗i
〉
= 0, (4)
〈vi, x∗i 〉 = u∗i :=
Bi
β∗i
, ∀ i, (5)
〈p∗ − β∗i vi, x∗i 〉 = 0, ∀ i. (6)
• Suppose x∗ is feasible to (1), (p∗, β∗) is feasible to (2)
and (4), (5) hold. Then, x∗ and (p∗, β∗) are optimal to (1)
and (2), respectively. Meanwhile, C + z∗ = w∗.
At the moment, the above lemma is “vacuous”: we do
not know whether C + z∗ = w∗ holds or, equivalently,
whether there exists feasible solutions satisfying (4) and (5).
This will be answered affirmatively by Theorem 1, where
we show that, from a a pure optimal solution of (1), we can
construct the (a.e. unique) optimal solution of (2).
Theorem 1. Let x∗ solves (1) and be that x∗i = 1Θi , where
Θi are a.e.-disjoint subsets of Θ (existence of such x∗ given
by Lemma 1). Let u∗i = vi(Θi) and β
∗
i = Bi/u
∗
i .
• For each i, we have β∗i vi ≥ β∗j vj a.e. for all j 6= i on Θi.
• Define p∗ = maxi β∗i vi. Then, for any measurable A ⊆
Θ, it holds that p∗(A) =
∑
i β
∗
i vi(A ∩Θi).
• The constructed (p∗, β∗) solves (2) and satisfies (4)-(6).
The above theorem ensures that there exists optimal solu-
tions of (1) and (2) satisfying all predicates in Lemma 4.
Thus, we see that in spite of the general difficulties with
duality theory in infinite dimensions, we have shown that
(1) and (2) behave like duals of each other: strong duality
holds, and we have KKT-like conditions (see, e.g., (Nisan
et al. 2007, §5.2) for the finite-dimensional counterparts). In
fact, we can even strengthen the above to show that optimal
solutions of (1) and (2) are ME, and vice versa.
Theorem 2. Assume x∗ and (p∗, β∗) solve (1) and (2), re-
spectively. Then (x∗, p∗) is a ME such that 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = Bi
and the equilibrium utility of buyer i is u∗i = 〈vi, x∗i 〉 =
Bi/β
∗
i . Conversely, if (x
∗, p∗) is a ME, then x∗ solves (1)
and (p∗, β∗), where β∗i :=
Bi
〈vi,x∗i 〉 , solves (2).
We list some useful direct consequences of the results we
have so far. Theorems 1 and Theorem 2 give the following.
Corollary 1. Let x∗ be as in Theorem 1, that is, x∗ solves
(1) and is pure. Then, x∗ is a pure equilibrium allocation.
Lemma 4 and Theorem 2 give the following.
Corollary 2. Let (x∗, p∗) be a ME. Then, x∗ and (p∗, β∗),
where β∗i :=
Bi
〈vi,x∗i 〉 , satisfy (6). In other words, for each i,
x∗i = 0 a.e. on {p∗ > β∗i vi}.
Properties of ME. Let x ∈ Xn+ ,
∑
i xi ≤ 1 be an allo-
cation. It is (strongly) Pareto optimal if there does not exist
x˜ ∈ Xn+ ,
∑
i x˜i ≤ 1 such that 〈vi, x˜i〉 ≥ 〈vi, xi〉 for all i and
the inequality is strict for at least one i (Cohler et al. 2011).
It is envy-free (w.r.t. the budgets) if BjBi 〈vi, xi〉 ≥ 〈vi, xj〉
for any j 6= i. When all Bi = 1, this is sometimes re-
ferred to as being “equitable” (Weller 1985). It is propor-
tional if 〈vi, xi〉 ≥ Bi‖B‖1 vi(Θ) for all i. Similar to the finite-
dimensional case (Jain and Vazirani 2010; Nisan and Ronen
2001), market equilibria in infinite-dimensional Fisher mar-
kets also have these properties.
Theorem 3. Let (x∗, p∗) be a ME. Then, x∗ is Pareto opti-
mal, envy-free and proportional.
Bounds on equilibrium quantities. We can establish up-
per and lower bounds on equilibrium quantities (recall that
vi(Θ) = 1 and ‖B‖1 = 1 w.l.o.g.). These bounds will be
useful in efficient optimization of (3). Similar bounds hold
in the finite-dimensional case (Gao and Kroer 2020).
Lemma 5. For any ME (x∗, p∗), we have p∗(Θ) = 1. Fur-
thermore, Bi ≤ u∗i = 〈vi, x∗i 〉 ≤ 1 and hence
¯
βi = 1 ≤
β∗i :=
Bi
u∗i
≤ β¯i := 1Bi for all i.
Discrete item space Θ. All of the results so far, except the
existence of a pure solution of (1) (hence a pure equilibrium
allocation), hold even when Θ is discrete (finite or countably
infinite). In this case, µ(A) = |A|, the cardinality of A ⊆ Θ,
is the counting measure on Θ and vi ∈ `1(Θ) are summable
sequences, i.e., vi(Θ) = 〈vi,1〉 =
∑
i∈Θ vi(θ) < ∞.
〈f, g〉 := ∑θ∈Θ f(θ)g(θ) for any f, g : Θ → R. If vi is
summable, its induced measure is clearly finite and abso-
lutely continuous w.r.t. µ. In this case, Lemma 1 partially
holds. The supremum can still be attained by some x∗ (c.f.
proof of Lemma 10 and its use of (Dvoretzky et al. 1951,
Theorem 1)). However, it may not be attained by a pure so-
lution. This is because the proof of existence of a pure op-
timal solution relies on (Dvoretzky et al. 1951, Theorem 5),
which requires vi to be atomless. When Θ is discrete, any
nonzero vi, as a measure, is necessarily atomic: vi({θ}) > 0
for some singleton {θ}, which clearly does not contain any
subset of a smaller nonzero measure.
4 Efficient optimization of (3)
In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise stated, we always
use x∗ or {Θi} to denote a pure equilibrium allocation.
We also use β∗ to denote the unique optimal solution of
(3) and p∗ the a.e. uniuqe equilibrium prices, which satisfy
p∗ = maxi β∗i vi and (4)-(6) together with x
∗ (Lemma 4 and
Theorem 2). The convex program (3) is finite-dimensional
and has a real-valued, convex and continuous objective func-
tion (Lemma 3). By Lemma 5, we can also add the con-
straint β ∈ [
¯
β, β¯] without affecting the optimal solution.
This makes the “dual” (3) more computationally tractable
than its “primal” (1).
Ellipsoid method for piecewise linear vi. We show that,
for piecewise linear (p.w.l.) vi over Θ = [0, 1], we can com-
pute a solution β˜ such that ‖β˜−β∗‖ ≤  in time polynomial
in log 1 , n andK =
∑
iKi. This is achieved via solving (3)
using the ellipsoid method. Consider the following generic
convex program (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski 2019, §4.1.4):
f∗ := min
x
f(x) s.t. x ∈ X (7)
where f is convex and continuous (and hence subdifferen-
tiable) on a convex compact X ⊆ Rn. Assume we have
access to the following oracles:
• The separation oracle S: given any x ∈ Rn, either report
x ∈ intX or return a g 6= 0 (representing a separating
hyperplane) such that 〈g, x〉 ≥ 〈g, y〉 for any y ∈ X .
• The first-order or subgradient oracle G: given x ∈ intX
(the interior of X), return a subgradient f ′(x) of f at x,
that is, f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈f ′(x), y − x〉 for any y.
The time complexity of the ellipsoid method is as follows.
Theorem 4. (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski 2019, Theorem 4.1.2)
Let V = maxx∈X f(x) − f∗, R = supx∈X ‖x‖, and
r > 0 be the radius of a Euclidean ball contained in X .
For any  > 0, it is possible to find an -solution x (i.e.,
f(x) ≤ f∗ + ) with no more than N() calls to S and
G, followed by no more than O(1)n2N() arithmetic oper-
ations to process the answer of the oracles, where N() =
O(1)n2 log
(
2 + V Rr
)
.
In order to make use of the ellipsoid method for (2) for
p.w.l. vi, we need to derive efficient oracles S and G. To
this end, we need some elementary lemmas regarding p.w.l.
linear functions.
Lemma 6. For any β ∈ Rn+, the function θ 7→ maxi βivi(θ)
is piecewise linear with at most n(K − n+ 1) pieces.
Lemma 7. Suppose fi(θ) = ciθ + di ≥ 0, for all θ ∈
[l, u] ⊆ [0, 1], i ∈ [n]. Then, hn(θ) = maxi fi(θ) is piece-
wise linear on [l, u] with at most n pieces. Furthermore, the
breakpoints of hn, l = a0 < a1 < · · · < an′ = u (n′ ≤ n)
can be found in O(n2) time.
Assume that each vi is Ki-piecewise linear (possibly dis-
continuous). There are in total K =
∑
iKi pieces. Denote
φ(β) = 〈maxi βivi,1〉. From the proof of Lemma 3, we
know that φ is finite, convex and continuous on Rn+. Hence,
it is subdifferentiable on Rn++ (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski
2019, Proposition C.6.5). First, we show that, if all vi are
linear on a common interval and zero otherwise, a subgradi-
ent of φ(β) can be constructed in O(n2) time. This utilizes
the additivity (in terms of integration or expectation) prop-
erty of subgradients, as formalized in the following lemma.
Here, Θ ⊆ Rd can be a general compact set and e(i) is the
ith unit vector in Rd.
Lemma 8. Let f(β, θ) = maxi βivi(θ). For any θ ∈ Θ,
a subgradient of f(·, θ) at β is g(β, θ) = vi∗(θ)e(i∗),
where i∗ ∈ arg maxi βivi(θ) (taking the smallest index if
there is a tie). Hence, a subgradient of φ(β) is φ′(β) =∫
Θ
g(β, θ)dθ = µ(Θ) · Eθg(β, θ), where the expectation is
over θ ∼ Unif(Θ).
Using Lemma 8 and the p.w.l. structure of vi, we have the
following for computing a subgradient of φ.
Lemma 9. For each i, assume that vi(θ) = ciθ+di ≥ 0 on
an interval [l, u] ⊆ [0, 1].
• The function θ 7→ maxi βivi(θ) has at most n linear
pieces on [l, u], with breakpoints l = a0 < a1 < · · · <
an′ = · · · = an = u, n′ ≤ n (depending on β).
• We can construct φ′(β) ∈ ∂φ(β) for any β > 0 as fol-
lows: the ith component of φ′(β) is∑
k∈[n′]: i∗k=i
(ci∗k
2
(a2k − a2k−1) + di∗k(ak − ak−1)
)
,
where i∗k is the (unique) winner (with the smallest index
among ties) on [ak−1, ak].
• The above construction of φ′(β) takes O(n2) time.
When vi are Ki-piecewise linear on [0, 1], using Lemma
9, we can compute a subgradient φ′(β) by summing up the
above construction over the intervals given by the break-
points of all vi, and there are at most K such intervals.
Theorem 5. For any β > 0, a subgradient φ′(β) can be
computed in O(n2K) time.
Combining the above results, we have the following over-
all time complexity. Again, we assume that vi(Θ) = 1 and∑
iBi = 1 (w.l.o.g.). For general vi and Bi that do not sat-
isfy this, we can normalize them in O(nK) time.
Theorem 6. Let Θ = [0, 1], vi(Θ) = 1 for all i, ‖B‖1 =
1 and  > 0. A solution β˜ such that ‖β˜ − β∗‖ ≤ 
can be computed in O
(
n4K log n·maxi Bi·mini Bi
)
time, which is
O
(
n4K log n
)
when Bi = 1/n for all i.
The ellipsoid method can be applied to (3) more gener-
ally than for the case of p.w.l. vi. It finds a solution β that
is -close to β∗ in time log 1 as long as we can compute
φ′(β) efficiently. By Lemma 8. since a “pointwise” subgra-
dient g(β, θ) of f(β, θ) is much easier to compute, we can
compute a “full” subgradient φ′(β) efficiently as long as the
integral (expectation) can be evaluated efficiently.
Stochastic optimization for general Θ and vi . When a
full subgradient φ′(β) is difficult to compute, we can still
utilize the expectation characterization in Lemma 8 to use
a stochastic optimization algorithm to solve (3). The prob-
lem structure is particularly suitable for the stochastic dual
averaging (SDA) algorithm (Xiao 2010; Nesterov 2009). It
solves problems of the following form:
min
β
Eθf(β, θ) + Ψ(β), (8)
where Ψ is a strongly convex regularization function such
that dom Ψ = {β : Ψ(β) < ∞} is closed. Let θ ∼ D be
a random variable with distribution D and f(·, θ) be convex
and subdifferentiable on dom Ψ for all θ ∈ Θ. The algorithm
works as follows (Xiao 2010, Algorithm 1). Again, assume
Algorithm 1: Stochastic dual averaging (SDA)
Initialize: Choose β1 ∈ dom Ψ and g¯0 = 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
Sample θt ∼ D and compute gt ∈ ∂βf(β, θt)
g¯t = t−1t g¯
t−1 + 1t gt
βt+1 = arg minβ {〈g¯t, β〉+ Ψ(β)} (∗)
µ(Θ) = 1. To solve (3), we set f(β, θ) = maxi βivi(θ) and
D = Unif(Θ). By Lemma 8, we can choose gt = g(β, θt) ∈
∂βf(β, θt). Let Ψ(β) = −
∑
iBi log βi if β ∈ [
¯
β, β¯] and
= ∞ o.w. (that is, dom Ψ = [
¯
β, β¯]). Given these specifica-
tions, in Algorithm 1, the step (∗) yields a simple, explicit
update: at iteration t, compute βt+1i = Π[
¯
βi,β¯i]
(
Bi
g¯ti
)
for all
i, where Π[a,b](c) = min{max{a, c}, b} is the projection
onto a closed interval. It can be derived easily from its first-
order optimality condition. Using the convergence results in
(Xiao 2010) for strongly convex Ψ, we can show that the
uniform average of all βt generated by SDA converges to
β∗ both in mean square error (MSE) and with high proba-
bility, with mild finiteness assumptions on vi.
Theorem 7. Assume vi ∈ L2(Θ), that is, 〈v2i ,1〉 =
Eθ[vi(θ)2] < ∞ for all i. Let G2 := Eθ[maxi vi(θ)2] < ∞
and σ = miniB3i . Let β˜
t := 1t
∑t
τ=1 β
τ . Then,
E‖β˜t − β∗‖2 ≤ 6(1+log t)+ 12 (log t)2t × G
2
σ2 .
Next, further assume that vi ≤ G a.e. for all i. Then, for
any δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − 4δ log t, we have
‖β˜t − β∗‖2 ≤ 2Mtσ , where
Mt =
∆t
t +
4G
t
√
∆t log(1/δ)
σ + max
{
16G2
σ , 6V
}
log(1/δ)
t ,
∆t =
G2
2σ (6 + log t) and V =
2n
mini Bi
.
Remark In the above theorem, the bound onE‖β˜t−β∗‖2
(MSE) is of order O
(
(log t)2
t
)
, where the constant degrades
upon buyer heterogeneity, i.e., a smaller miniBi leads to a
larger bound (recall that ‖B‖1 = 1 and therefore miniBi ≤
1
n ). For the second half regarding ‖β˜t − β∗‖2, substituting
δ = 1tα (α ≥ 1) yields a bound of order O
(
log t
t
)
(also
depending inversely on miniBi), with probability at least
1− 4 log ttα . In addition, the added assumptionsEθ[maxi v2i ] <∞ and vi ≤ G a.e. for all i are always satisfied as long as
they are (a.e.) bounded (e.g., p.w.l. functions).
Deterministic optimization using φ′(β). When φ′(β)
can be computed, such as when vi are piecewise linear on
Θ = [0, 1] (Theorem 5), in Algorithm 1, we can replace gt
with a full subgradient φ′(βt). Then, ‖βt−β∗‖2 is determin-
istic and bounded by the same right hand side as the first half
of Theorem 7. In this case, if vi ≤ G a.e., then it can be eas-
ily verified that ‖φ′(β)‖2 ≤ nG2 <∞ for all β > 0. Then,
we can also use a projected subgradient descent method that
achieves ‖βˆt − β∗‖2 = O(n/t), where βˆt is a weighted av-
erage of β1, . . . , βt (see, e.g., (Lacoste-Julien, Schmidt, and
Bach 2012) and (Bubeck 2015, Theorem 3.9)).
Approximate equilibrium prices. Suppose we have ob-
tained an approximate solution β˜ such that ‖β˜ − β∗‖ ≤ .
Then, define p˜ = maxi β˜ivi, which is in L1(Θ)+ by Lemma
2. We have ‖p˜ − p∗‖ = ∫
Θ
∣∣∣maxi β˜ivi −maxi β∗i vi∣∣∣ dµ ≤∫
Θ
(
‖β˜ − β∗‖∞
∑
i |vi|
)
dµ ≤ n. Recall that for any β˜,
the prices p˜ defined above is a p.w.l. function with at most
n(K − n + 1) pieces (Lemma 6). By Lemma 7, finding
its p.w.l. representation (breakpoints and linear coefficients
on each piece) takes O(n2K) time. Therefore, under the
same time complexity as in Theorem 6 (where the addi-
tional factor n is inside log and is absorbed into the con-
stant), we can compute an approximate equilibrium prices
p˜ such that ‖p˜ − p∗‖ ≤ . Furthermore, under prices p˜, the
true x∗ may violate buyers’ budget constraints: 〈p˜, x∗〉 =
〈p∗, x∗i 〉+ 〈p˜− p∗, x∗i 〉 ≤ Bi + ‖p˜− p∗‖ = Bi + n, where
the inequality uses Theorem 2 (budget of buyer i depleted,
i.e., 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = 1) and x∗i ≤ 1. Hence, consider the mixed
allocation x˜i = BiBi+nx
∗
i for all i. This allocation satisfies∑
i x˜i ≤ 1 and, for each i, its budget constraint is satis-
fied: 〈p˜, x˜i〉 = BiBi+n 〈p˜, x∗〉 ≤ Bi. Meanwhile, the utility
of buyer i from x˜i is u˜i = 〈vi, x˜i〉 = BiBi+nu∗i , which is
close to the equilibrium utility u∗i as long as n Bi.
5 Construction of an equilibrium allocation
Throughout this section (as in §4), β∗ is the optimal solu-
tion of (3), p∗ = maxi β∗i vi is the equilibrium prices and
u∗i =
Bi
β∗i
is the equilibrium utility. Given β∗, we can con-
struct a pure equilibrium allocation x∗ explicitly if we al-
low arbitrary division of measurable subsets. This is possible
only if vi, and hence p∗, are atomless.
Theorem 8. For any S ⊆ [n], define
ΘS =
{{p∗ = β∗i vi > β∗` v`, ∀ i ∈ S, ` /∈ S} if S 6= ∅,
{p∗ = β∗i vi = 0, ∀ i ∈ [n]} if S = ∅.
• {ΘS}S⊆[n] is a measurable partition of Θ.
• There exits b = (bi,S) ≥ 0, i ∈ [n], S ⊆ [n] such that (i)
bi,S = 0 if i /∈ S, (ii)
∑
i bi,S = p
∗(ΘS) for all S and
(iii)
∑
S bi,S = Bi for all i.
• We can partition each ΘS into measurable subsets Θi,S ,
i ∈ S such that p∗(Θi,S) = bi,S (meanwhile, Θi,S :=
∅ if i /∈ S). Let Θi = ∪SΘi,S (the leftover Θ∅ can be
assigned arbitrarily). The resulting pure allocation {Θi}
is an optimal solution of (1) and hence, by Theorem 2, a
pure equilibrium allocation.
The above construction of x∗ requires constructing ΘS ,
S ⊆ [n] via partitioning measurable sets and solving a large
linear system of size 2n. Nonetheless, often an equilibrium
allocation, or even a pure one, can be constructed more eas-
ily. We give some concrete examples below.
Finite item space Θ. In this case, simply solve the lin-
ear feasibility problem
∑
θ∈Θ vi(θ)xi(θ) = u
∗
i , ∀ i and∑
i xi(θ) ≤ 1, ∀ θ to obtain an equilibrium allocation. This
can be cast as a linear program and solved efficiently. It has
a solution since an equilibrium allocation exists.
P.w.l. valuations. For the case of p.w.l. vi in §4, p∗ can
have at most n(K − n + 1) linear pieces with breakpoints
0 = a0 < a1 < · · · < aN = 1, N ≤ n(K − n + 1).
These breakpoints consist of (i) the “static” breakpoints of
all vi and (ii) the intersections of the linear pieces of β∗i vi be-
tween these breakpoints. Each interval between two break-
points, on which every vi is linear, is further divided into at
most n small subintervals (Lemma 7), leading to the subin-
tervals [ak−1, ak], k ∈ [N ] above. On each [ak−1, ak], for
i 6= j, the line segments β∗i vi and β∗j vj either separate com-
pletely or overlapping completely, except possibly at end-
points. For k ∈ [N ], let Ik 6= ∅ be the set of “winners” on
[ak−1, ak], that is, for i ∈ Ik and j /∈ Ik, p∗ = β∗i vi > β∗j vj
on (ak−1, ak). In the language of Theorem 8, we only need
to consider Θi,k, i ∈ [n], k ∈ [N ] such that i ∈ Ik. This
is because, by Corollary 2, x∗i must not allocate anything on
[ak−1, ak] such that p∗ > β∗i vi (i.e., x
∗
i = 0 on [ak−1, ak] if
i /∈ Ik). Therefore, we only need to solve for b = (bi,k) ∈
Rn×N+ . Meanwhile, p∗([ak−1, ak]) = β∗i vi([ak−1, ak]) (for
some i ∈ Ik) can be easily computed, since vi is linear
on [ak−1, ak]. Splitting each Θk := [ak−1, ak] into Θi,k,
i ∈ Ik according to each winner’s bi,k is also trivial: since
p∗ = β∗i vi (i ∈ Ik) is linear on [ak−1, ak], we can parti-
tion [ak−1, ak] into consecutive intervals Θi,k, each having
p∗(Θi,k) = bi,k, i ∈ Ik.
Multidimensional linear valuations. Let Θ = [
¯
θ, θ¯] ⊆
Rd be a rectangle where
¯
θ < θ¯. Then, µ(Θ) =
∏
i(θ¯i−¯θi) ∈
(0,∞). Let αi ∈ Rd, α0i ∈ R and vi(θ) = α>i θ + α0i ≥
0 for all θ ∈ Θ. For simplicity, further assume that all vi
are distinct. Define Θi = {β∗i vi ≥ β∗j vj , ∀ j 6= i}. It is
prescribed by linear inequalities and hence is a polytope too.
For any i 6= j, we have Θi ∩Θj ⊆ {β∗i vi = β∗j vj} = {θ ∈
Θ : (β∗i αi − β∗jαj)>θ = β∗jα0j − β∗i α0i }. If β∗jα0j 6= β∗i α0i ,
the right-hand side is a hyperplane in Rd, whose intersection
with Θ has measure zero. Hence, µ(Θi∩Θj) = 0. If β∗jα0j =
β∗i α
0
i , then we have β
∗
jα
0
j 6= β∗i α0i (otherwise vi = vj , since
‖v`‖ = 1 and v` ≥ 0 for all `. Hence, {β∗i vi = β∗j vj} = ∅,
which implies µ(Θi ∩ Θj) = 0. Therefore, {Θi} defined
this way is already a.e.-disjoint. By Theorem 8, x∗i = 1Θi
gives a pure equilibrium allocation (in this case, µ(ΘS) = 0
for any S ⊂ [n], |S| ≥ 2). More generally, suppose that
vi are distinct and, for any i 6= j, if vi = λvj for some
λ > 0, then vi = vj . Then, analogously, Θi = {β∗i vi ≥
β∗j vj , ∀ j 6= i} are also pairwise a.e.-disjoint and constitute
a pure equilibrium allocation.
Next, we discuss how to handle buyers with identical dis-
tributions. Let x∗ ({Θi}) be a pure equilibrium allocation.
For any i and 0 < λ < 1, we can split vi into two buyers with
valuations λvi, (1 − λ)vi and budgets λBi, (1 − λ)Bi, re-
spectively. Then, it can be easily verified that λx∗i , (1−λ)x∗i
are in the new demand sets of the two split buyers (i.e.,
buyer-wise optimal under price p∗) and achieve utilities λu∗i ,
(1 − λ)u∗i , respectively. This “buyer divisibility” property
of ME is well-known in the finite-dimensional case. Since
vi is atomless, we can partition Θi into Θ′i and Θ
′′
i such
that vi(Θ′i) = λu
∗
i , vi(Θ
′′
i ) = (1 − λ)u∗i . Hence, when vi,
i ∈ [n] are not distinct, we can first merge the buyers with
identical valuations, compute the equilibrium allocation in
the reduced market and then allocate proportionally (w.r.t.
the budgets) among buyers having identical valuations. Let
the reduced market consist of s buyers I1, . . . , Is, s ≤ n (vi,
i ∈ I` are identical and vi 6= vj for i ∈ I`, j ∈ I`′ , ` 6= `′).
Given a pure equilibrium allocation x∗I` = 1ΘI` , ` ∈ [s] for
the reduced market, for each ` ∈ [s], let x∗i = Bi∑
j∈I` Bj
x∗I`
for each i ∈ I` (i.e., proportional to its budget). It gives an
equilibrium allocation x∗, possibly mixed, for the original
market. Since all vi are atomless, we can also partition ΘI`
into Θi, i ∈ I` such that vi(Θi) = Bi∑
i∈I` B`
vi(ΘI`). How-
ever, depending on the vi, finding these partitions may be
computationally intractable. For example, under linear vi,
dividing a given polytope into two smaller ones with given
volumes is hard, since computing the volume of a polytope
is #P -hard in general (Khachiyan 1989; 1993).
One future work is to construct an approximate pure equi-
librium allocation Θ˜i, with any provable guarantee, from an
approximate solution β˜ of (3). For example, in the previous
p.w.l. example, the construction of x∗ given β∗ relies crit-
ically on the medley of properties of the equilibrium quan-
tities x∗, p∗ and β∗, especially (6), i.e., buyer i only allo-
cates on where it “wins” (in the p.w.l. example, i ∈ Ik). In
contrast, for piecewise constant vi, we can divide [0, 1] into
static intervals independent of β˜, regarded as discrete items,
and compute a ME of the resulting finite-dimensional Fisher
market (Aziz and Ye 2014, Theorem 2 & Algorithm 2). As
noted in (Cohler et al. 2011), this observation does not ap-
ply when vi are p.w.l. Indeed, for piecewise linear vi, the
“correct” discretization of [0, 1] cannot be determined un-
less we have computed β∗ (and hence p∗) exactly. Another
necessary ingredient in this regard is the construction of a
pure allocation from a known mixed one, preserving the util-
ities of all buyers. In other words, for an arbitrary (possibly
mixed) x ∈ Xn+ ,
∑
i xi ≤ 1, we must find a.e. disjoint {Θ˜i},
Θ˜i ⊆ Θ such that vi(Θi) ≥ ui := 〈vi, xi〉 for all i and each
Θ˜i is the union of polynomially many intervals. Such {Θ˜i}
must exist, since vi as measure are atomless (c.f. Lemma 1
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Figure 1: A division of [0, 1] given by β˜, where each buyer i
gets the interval shown in the legend, on which p˜ = β˜ivi
and (Dvoretzky et al. 1951, Theorem 5)). For general vi, in
the utility-preserving pure allocation {Θ˜i}, some Θ˜i may be
the union of an exponential number of intervals (Dvoretzky
et al. 1951, Theorem 3). When each vi is Ki-p.w.l., each Θ˜i
can be the union of at most Ki intervals. In this case, how-
ever, a tractable construction still remains a challenge.
An illustrative example. Consider n buyers with distinct
linear valuations vi on the item space Θ = [0, 1] such that
vi(Θ) = 1 for all i. In this case, p∗ = maxi β∗i vi is piece-
wise linear with exactly n pieces, since (i) it has at most n
pieces by Lemma 7 and (ii) each buyer i “wins” at least one
piece, i.e., p∗ = β∗i vi on a nonempty closed interval (other-
wise, by Corollary 2, buyer i has x∗i = 0 and gets u
∗
i = 0,
contradicting to Lemma 5). We construct a small instance
with n = 4 and solve its convex program (3) using Algo-
rithm 1 (SDA). When βt converges numerically, we con-
struct a final division, which is given by the n intervals as
well as the (unique) winners on each interval, as shown in
Figure 1. More details can be found in Appendix B.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Motivated by applications in ad auctions and fair recom-
mender systems, we considered a Fisher market with a con-
tinuum of items and the concept of a market equilibrium in
this setting. Based on the finite-dimensional Eisenberg-Gale
convex program and its dual, we proposed convex programs
whose optimal solutions are ME, and vice versa. Duality
properties of the convex programs parallel various structural
properties of ME. Due to the limitation of the general dual-
ity theory for optimization over infinite-dimensional vector
spaces, we established these properties via directly exploit-
ing the problem structure. In particular, we showed that a
ME must exist, and it satisfies various duality and fairness
criteria. We also gave efficient algorithms for solving the
finite-dimensional convex program (3) in the bang-per-buck
variables. To this end, we showed that, for one-dimensional
piecewise linear valuations, we can derive efficient first-
order and separation oracles, which allowed ut to apply the
ellipsoid method. Lastly, we discussed the construction of an
equilibrium allocation from the optimal solution and gave an
illustrative example.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We first show that the “utility feasible region” is compact.
Lemma 10. Define
U =
{
(u1, . . . , un) : ui = 〈vi, xi〉, x ∈ Xn+,
∑
i
xi ≤ 1
}
⊆ Rn+
and
U ′ = {(v1(Θ1), . . . , vn(Θn)) : Θi ⊂ Θ measurable and disjoint} ⊆ Rn+.
We have U = U ′. Furthermore, it is convex and compact.
Proof. Note that vi as measures are atomless. Consider the set X¯ = {(x, xn+1) ∈ Xn+1+ :
∑
i xi + xn+1 = 1}. Define
U¯ =
{
u ∈ Rn×(n+1) : uij = 〈vi, xj〉, (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n+ 1], xi ∈ X+
n+1∑
i=1
xi = 1
}
and
U¯ ′ =
{
u ∈ Rn×(n+1) : uij = vi(Θj), (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n+ 1], {Θ1, . . . ,Θn+1} is a measurable partition of Θ
}
.
By (Dvoretzky et al. 1951, Theorem 1), U is a convex and compact set inRn(n+1). By (Dvoretzky et al. 1951, Theorem 4) and vi
being atomless, we have U¯ = U¯ ′. Therefore, their (Euclidean) projections on to the n dimensions corresponding to uii, i ∈ [n]
are also equal, that is, U = U ′. It is convex compact (in Rn) since projection preserves compactness in a finite-dimensional
Euclidean space.
Next, we show Lemma 1. By Lemma 10, the set U = U ′ ⊆ Rn+ is convex and compact. Let ρ(u) = −
∑
iBi log ui. Taking
u0i = 〈vi,1/n〉 = 1nvi(Θ) for all i ensures u0 ∈ U and ρ(u0) ∈ R (finite). Since
ui ≤ 〈vi,1〉 = vi(Θ) <∞
for all u ∈ U , we have ∑
i
Bi log ui ≤M :=
∑
i
Bi log vi(Θ) <∞.
Hence, there exists  > 0 sufficiently small such that, for u ∈ U , if some ui ≤ , then
ρ(u) ≥ −Bi log −M > ρ(u0).
In fact, it suffices to have −Bi log  > ρ(u∗) +M for all i, or simply
 < e−
ρ(u0)+M
‖B‖∞ .
Hence, removing all u ∈ U such that mini ui <  does not affect the infimum of ρ over U , that is,
inf
u∈U
ρ(u) = inf
u∈U :u≥
ρ(u).
Since {u ∈ U : u ≥ } is compact (as a closed subset of the compact set U) and ρ is continuous on it, by the extreme value
theorem, there exists a minimizer u∗ ∈ U (such that u ≥ ). By the definition of U ′ (= U) (c.f. Lemma 10), there exists x∗ such
that x∗i = 1Θi (where Θi are disjoint measurable subsets of Θ) and
u∗i = 〈vi, x∗i 〉 = vi(Θi).
Finally, if supi Θi ( Θ, then assign Θ \ (∪iΘi) to buyer 1, that is, augment Θ1 so that supi Θi = Θ. This does not affect∑
i xi ≤ 1, nor does it affect optimality (since vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) if S ⊆ T ⊆ Θ, all measurable). In fact, Θ0 := Θ \ (∪iΘi)
corresponds to the subset on which all buyers have valuation 0 a.e.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose V = Lq(Θ), q ∈ [1,∞]. Then the Banach space norm is
‖f‖ =
{(∫
Θ
|f |qdµ)1/q if q <∞,
inf{M ≥ 0 : |f | ≤M a.e.} if q =∞.
Note that they are also well-defined even if ‖vi‖ =∞. Since 0 ≤ p := maxi βivi ≤
∑
i βivi, we have
0 ≤ ‖p‖ ≤
∑
i
βi‖vi‖ <∞.
Therefore, p ∈ V+.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Denote the objective function of (3) as ψ(β). Notice that
max
i
βivi ≤
∑
i
βivi
and therefore
0 ≤
〈
max
i
βivi,1
〉
≤
∑
i
βi〈vi,1〉, ∀β > 0.
Meanwhile, for any λ ∈ [0, 1], β, β′ ∈ Rn+, θ ∈ Θ,
max
i
(λβi + (1− λ)β′i) vi(θ) ≤ λmax
i
βivi(θ) + (1− λ) max
i
β′ivi(θ).
Therefore, 〈
max
i
(λβi + (1− λ)β′i) vi,1
〉
≤ λmax
i
〈βivi,1〉+ (1− λ)〈max
i
β′ivi,1〉.
In other words, the function
β 7→
〈
max
i
βivi,1
〉
is convex. Since β 7→ −∑iBi log βi is strongly convex on Rn++, we know that ψ is real-valued, strongly convex and hence
continuous on Rd++. Furthermore, for any i, when βi → 0 or βi → ∞, we have ψ(β) → ∞. Hence, for β0 = (1, . . . , 1) > 0,
there exists 0 <
¯
β < β¯ <∞ (c.f. the proof of Lemma 1; tighter bounds are given in Lemma 5) such that
β /∈ [
¯
β, β¯]⇒ ψ(β) > ψ(β0).
Therefore, we can restrict β inside a closed interval without affecting the infimum:
inf
β∈Rn+
ψ(β) = inf
β∈[
¯
β,β¯]
ψ(β).
The right-hand side is the infimum of a continuous function on a compact set. Therefore, the infimum is attaind at some
β∗ ∈ [
¯
β, β¯]. Clearly, β∗ > 0. It is unique since ψ is strongly convex.
Finally, when solving (2), for any fixed β, the objective is clearly minimized at p = maxi βivi ∈ V+ (c.f. Lemma 2).
Therefore, we can eliminate p in this way and obtain (3). In other words, for the optimal solution β∗ of (3), setting p∗ :=
maxi β
∗
i vi gives an optimal solution (p
∗, β∗) of (2), which is (a.e.) unique.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
View (2) as the “primal” convex program. Associate Lagrange multipliers xi ∈ (V+)∗ to constraints
p ≥ βivi ⇔ p− βivi ∈ V+.
The Lagrangian is
L(p, β;x) = 〈p,1〉 −
∑
i
Bi log βi −
∑
i
〈p− βivi, xi〉
=
∑
i
(βi〈vi, xi〉 −Bi log βi) +
〈
p,1−
∑
i
xi
〉
.
If not 1 ≥ ∑i xi a.e., then 〈p,1−∑i xi〉 can be arbitrarily negative. If 1 ≥ ∑i xi, then 〈p,1−∑i xi〉 is minimized at any
p ∈ V+ such that 〈p,1−
∑
i xi〉 = 0, e.g., p = 0. Meanwhile,
βi〈vi, xi〉 −Bi log βi
is clearly minimized at βi = Bi〈vi,xi〉 . Therefore, the dual objective is, for x ∈ (V+)n,
g(x) = inf
(p,β)∈V+×Rn+
L(p, β;x) =
{‖B‖1 −∑iBi logBi +∑Bi log〈vi, xi〉 if ∑i xi ≤ 1
−∞ o.w. .
For any x ∈ (X+)n such that
∑
i xi ≤ 1, we have the following chain of inequalities:
C +
∑
i
log〈vi, xi〉 = min
{L(p, β;x) : (p, β) ∈ V+ × Rn+} [by the above derivation of g(x)]
≤ inf {L(p, β;x) : (p, β) ∈ V+ × Rn+, p ≥ βivi, ∀ i} [due to the additional constraints]
≤ inf
{
〈p,1〉 −
∑
i
log βi : (p, β) ∈ V+ × Rn+, p ≥ βivi, ∀ i
}
[p ≥ βivi ⇒ 〈p− βivi, xi〉 ≥ 0]
= w∗. (9)
Taking supremum over x ∈ Xn+ ,
∑
i x ≤ 1 on both sides yields weak duality:1
C + z∗ ≤ w∗.
Meanwhile, when z∗ is attained by some x∗ feasible to (1), we have strong duality:
n+
∑
i
log〈vi, x∗i 〉 = n+ z∗ = w∗.
Hence, when x = x∗, all inequalities in (9) become equalities. In particular,
L(p∗, β∗;x∗) = min{L(p, β;x∗) : (p, β) ∈ V+ × Rn+} , (10)
L(p∗, β∗;x∗) = 〈p∗,1〉 −
∑
i
Bi log β
∗
i . (11)
By (10), similar to the above derivation of g(x), we know that p∗ minimizes
p 7→
〈
p,1−
∑
i
x∗i
〉
over p ∈ V+, which implies (4). Meanwhile, β∗ minimizes
β 7→
∑
i
(βi〈vi, x∗i 〉 −Bi log βi)
over β ∈ Rn+, which implies (5). Furthermore, complementary slackness follows immediately from (11).
Conversely, for x∗ feasible to (1) and (p∗, β∗) feasible to (2) such that (4), (5) hold, we have
C + z∗ ≥ C +
∑
i
log〈vi, x∗i 〉 [x∗ is feasible to (1)]
= min
{L(p, β, x∗) : (p, β) ∈ V+ × Rn+} [same as the first equality of (9)]
= L(p∗, β∗;x∗) [by (4) and (5)]
≥ 〈p∗,1〉 −
∑
i
Bi log β
∗
i [since 〈p∗ − β∗i vi, x∗i 〉 ≥ 0]
≥ w∗. [(p∗, β∗) is feasible to (2)]
Since C + z∗ ≤ w∗, the above chain of inequalities must all be equalities. Therefore, strong duality holds with both optima
attained:
C + z∗ = C +
∑
i
Bi log〈vi, x∗i 〉 = 〈p∗,1〉 −
∑
i
Bi log β
∗
i = w
∗.
1Omitting the constant, the Lagrange dual supx∈((V+)∗)n g(x) is precisely (1) but with the cone X+ replaced by the much larger (V+)∗
(recall that L∞(Θ)∗ is a much richer space than L1(Θ)). This is the Lagrange dual of (2) (see, e.g., (Luenberger 1997, §8.6) and (Ponstein
2004, §3)). We do not need to work with it. Again, we first define the convex programs (1), (2) instead and then show that they exhibit various
duality properties.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that, for some i, there exists a measurable A ⊆ Θi (µ(A) 6= 0) such that
β∗i vi(A) < β
∗
j vj(A). (12)
Then, for α ∈ (0, 1), consider
x˜i = 1Θi − α1A, x˜j = 1Θj + α1A.
Clearly, replacing x∗i , x
∗
j by x˜i, x˜j does not affect feasibility to (1). We analyze the chance in the objective value. Note that
Bi log〈vi, x˜i〉+Bj log〈vj , x˜j〉 (13)
= Bi log (u
∗
i − αvi(A)) +Bj log
(
u∗j + αvj(A)
)
= Bi
[
log u∗i −
vi(A)
u∗i
· α− vi(A)
2
2ξ2i
· α2
]
+Bj
[
log u∗j +
vj(A)
u∗j
· α− vj(A)
2
2ξ2j
· α2
]
= (Bi log u
∗
i +Bj log u
∗
j ) +
(
β∗j vj(A)− β∗i vi(A)
)
α− vi(A)
2 + vj(A)
2
2
·
(
1
ξ2j
+
1
ξ2i
)
α2 (14)
for some ξi ∈ (u∗i − αvi(A), u∗i ) and ξj ∈ (u∗j , u∗j + αvj(A)), both depending on α (Taylor expansion of log). Let α0 be such
that
u∗i − α0vi(A) ≥
u∗i
2
> 0.
Then, for all α ∈ (0, α0), we have
vi(A)
2 + vj(A)
2
2
·
(
1
ξ2j
+
1
ξ2i
)
≤M :=
(
max
`
v`(Θ)
)(
4
(u∗i )2
+
1
(u∗j )2
)
<∞. (15)
By (12) and (15), we know that when
α ∈
(
0,
β∗j vj(A)− β∗i vi(A)
M
)
,
we have
(
β∗j vj(A)− β∗i vi(A)
)
α− vi(A)
2 + vj(A)
2
2
·
(
1
ξ2j
+
1
ξ2i
)
α2 ≥ (β∗j vj(A)− β∗i vi(A))α−Mα2 > 0.
Substituting the above into (14) yields
Bi log〈vi, x˜i〉+Bj log〈vj , x˜j〉 > Bi log u∗i +Bj log u∗j .
In other words, replacing x∗i , x
∗
j by x˜i, x˜j strictly increases the objective of (1), contradicting to the optimality of x
∗. Therefore,
on each Θi, we have β∗i vi ≥ β∗j vj a.e. for all j 6= i.
Let p∗ = maxi β∗i vi. Then, on each Θi, we have p
∗ = β∗i vi ≥ β∗j vj a.e. for all j 6= i. Therefore, for any measurable A ⊆ Θ,
we have p∗(A ∩Θi) = β∗i vi(A ∩Θi) and hence
p∗(A) =
∑
i
p∗(A ∩Θi) =
∑
i
β∗i vi(A ∪Θi).
Finally, we verify that x∗ and (p∗, β∗) satisfy the sufficient conditions for optimality in Lemma 4. Note that (p∗, β∗) is
feasible to (2) by the definition of p∗. Since {Θi} is a partition of Θ, we have
∑
i xi = 1. Therefore, (4) trivially holds.
Meanwhile, our construction of β∗ ensures (5), i.e., 〈vi, x∗i 〉 = Biβ∗i . Hence, by Lemma 4, (p
∗, β∗) solves (2) and (6) holds (in
addition to (4) and (5)).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2
We first show the forward direction (optimal solutions⇒ ME). By Theorem 2, the equalities (4)-(6) in Lemma 4 hold for x∗
and (p∗, β∗). First, (4) gives market clearance. Next, we show buyer optimality. For each i, by (5) and (6),
〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = β∗i 〈vi, x∗i 〉 = Bi. (16)
In words, x∗i depletes buyer i’s budget Bi and the utility buyer i receives is
〈vi, x∗i 〉 =
Bi
β∗i
.
Meanwhile, for any xi ∈ X+ such that 〈p∗, xi〉 ≤ Bi, since p∗ ≥ β∗i vi (by the choice of p∗), it holds that
〈vi, xi〉 ≤ 1
β∗i
〈p∗, xi〉 ≤ Bi
β∗i
= 〈vi, x∗i 〉.
Therefore,
x∗i ∈ Di(p∗).
Hence, (x∗, p∗) is a ME, where buyer i’s equilibrium utility is clearly u∗i := 〈vi, x∗i 〉 = Biβ∗i .
Conversely, let (x∗, p∗) be a ME and β∗i :=
Bi
u∗i
, where u∗i := 〈vi, x∗i 〉. We first check that (p∗, β∗) is feasible to (2). For any
i, suppose there exists a measurable A ⊆ Θ such that p∗(A) < β∗i vi(A). Then, consider xi = Bip∗(A) · 1A. We have
〈p∗, xi〉 ≤ Bi
and
〈vi, xi〉 = Bi · vi(A)
p∗(A)
>
Bi
β∗i
= u∗i = 〈vi, x∗i 〉,
contradicting to buyer optimality x∗i ∈ Di(p∗). Therefore, we must have
p∗ ≥ β∗i vi a.e., ∀ i
and (p∗, β∗) is feasible to (2). Meanwhile, x∗ is feasible to (1), since ME requires
∑
i x
∗
i ≤ 1. Furthermore, x∗ and (p∗, β∗)
satisfy (5) (by definition of u∗ and β∗) and (4) (since ME requires market clearance). Therefore, by Lemma 4, they must be
optimal to (1) and (2), respectively.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Since x∗ is an equilibrium allocation, by Theorem 2, it is also an optimal solution of (1). If there exists x˜ ∈ Xn+ ,
∑
i x˜i ≤ 1
such that 〈vi, x˜i〉 ≥ 〈vi, x∗i 〉 for all i and at least one inequality is strict, then∑
i
Bi log〈vi, x˜i〉 >
∑
i
Bi log〈vi, x∗i 〉,
i.e., x∗ is not an optimal solution of (1), a contradiction. Therefore, x∗ is Pareto optimal.
For any j 6= i, since 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = Bi (Theorem 2) and 〈p∗, x∗j 〉 = Bj , we have〈
p∗,
Bi
Bj
x∗j
〉
= Bi.
Since x∗i ∈ Di(p∗) and BiBj x∗j ≥ 0, we have
〈vi, x∗i 〉 ≥
〈
vi,
Bi
Bj
x∗j
〉
⇒ 〈vi, x
∗
i 〉
Bi
≥ 〈vi, x
∗
j 〉
Bj
.
Therefore, x∗ is envy-free.
By the market clearance condition of ME, we have
p∗(Θ) = 〈p∗,1〉 =
∑
i
〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = ‖B‖1.
Therefore, for each buyer i, it holds that〈
p∗,
Bi
‖B‖11
〉
=
Bi
‖B‖1 p
∗(Θ) =
Bi
‖B‖1 = Bi.
In other words, buyer i can afford the bundle Bi‖B‖11. Hence, its equilibrium utility must be at least〈
vi,
Bi
‖B‖11
〉
=
Bi
‖B‖1 vi(Θ).
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
By the characterization of p∗ in Theorem 1, clearly,
p∗(Θ) =
∑
i
p∗(Θi) =
∑
i
Bi = ‖B‖1,
where {Θi} is a pure equilibrium allocation. Since x∗i ≤ 1 (Θi ⊆ Θ), we have
u∗i = 〈vi, x∗i 〉 ≤ vi(Θ) = 1.
Meanwhile, since {Θi} is an equilibrium allocation, it is proportional (Theorem 3), that is, Bi‖B‖11 is a feasible bundle for buyer
i. Hence,
u∗i ≥
〈
vi,
Bi
‖B‖11
〉
=
Bi
‖B‖1 vi(Θ).
The bounds on β∗i =
Bi
u∗i
follow immediately.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 6
Since each vi has Ki pieces, i.e., Ki − 1 breakpoints in (0, 1), there are at most (K − n) breakpoints in total, denoted as
(including the endpoints) 0 = s0 < s1 < · · · < sK′ = 1 (K ′ ≤ K − n + 1). For k ∈ [K ′], on the interval [sk−1, sk], each vi
(and hence βivi) is linear. Therefore, on [sk−1, sk], the function maxi βivi is the maximum of n linear functions. By Lemma
7, it has at most n pieces on [sk−1, sk]. Hence, on [0, 1], maxi βivi has at most nK ′ ≤ n(K − n+ 1) pieces.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 7
We prove it by induction. Clearly, when n = 1, there is only one piece f1. It is trivially convex and continuous. Suppose it is
true for some n ≥ 1, that is,
hn(θ) = max
i∈[n]
fi(θ)
is convex, continuous and n-piecewise linear. For the case of (n+ 1), note that
hn+1(θ) := max
i∈[n+1]
fi(θ) = max {hn(θ), fn+1(θ)} .
Since fn+1 is linear, hn is convex and continuous, the set
{θ ∈ [l, u] : fn+1(θ) ≥ hn(θ)}
must be a closed convex subset (i.e., closed interval) of [l, u]. Therefore, hn+1 has at most one more piece than hn, that is, at
most (n+ 1) pieces in total. It is also convex and continuous since it is the maximum of two such functions.
To find the breakpoints, consider the following incremental procedure. Suppose we already have the sorted breakpoints of
hn:
l = a0 < a1 < · · · < an′ = u, n′ ≤ n.
We also keep track of ik, i.e., a “winner” on [ak−1, ak], that is, fik ≥ fi on [ak−1, ak] for all i 6= ik. Clearly, hn is a line
segment on each [ak−1, ak]. Suppose we add a new linear function fn+1(θ) = cn+1θ + dn+1. Then, for each k ∈ [n′], if
c 6= cn+1, find the intersection point (of the two lines of fn+1 and fk, while θk,n+1 =∞ if they are parallel):
θk,n+1 =
dn+1 − dk
ck − cn+1 .
Since hn is convex, continuous and piecewise linear, fn+1 can intersect with at most two of its n′ pieces. In other words, there
can be at most two k, ` ∈ [n′] such that θk,n+1, θ`,n+1 ∈ [l, u]. If so (k < `), use bisection to find all ak ∈ [θk,n+1, θ`,n+1] and
replace them with θk,n+1, θ`,n+1. The new set of sorted breakpoints are
l = a0 < · · · < θk,n+1 < θ`,n+1 < · · · < an′ = u.
Clearly, there are at most n′ + 1 ≤ n+ 1 breakpoints. A winner on [θk,n+1, θ`,n+1] is (n+ 1). Winners on other line segments
remain unchanged. It can be easily seen that the above procedure takesO(n) times. To find the breakpoints of hn, incrementally
add f1, . . . , fn and augment the array of sorted breakpoints. Hence, it takesO(n2) time to compute the breakpoints ak, k ∈ [n′],
n′ ≤ n of hn.
A.11 Proof of Lemma 8
The first half well-known, see, e.g., (Beck 2017, Theorem 3.50). In fact, by this theorem, the subdifferential is
∂βf(β, θ) = conv
{
vi(θ)e
(i) : i ∈ arg max
i
βivi(θ)
}
.
For the second half, note that for any β > 0, since g(β, θ) ∈ ∂θf(β, θ) we have
f(β′, θ)− f(β, θ) ≥ 〈g(β, θ), β′ − β〉, ∀β′ > 0.
Integrate w.r.t. θ over Θ on both sides yield
φ(β′)− φ(β) ≥
∫
Θ
〈g(β, θ), β′ − β〉dθ =
〈∫
Θ
g(β, θ)dθ, β′ − β
〉
,
where the (component-wise) integral
∫
Θ
g(β, θ)dθ is well-defined and finite, since each component of g(β, θ) is uniformly
bounded by the pointwise maximum maxi vi, which is integrable:
0 ≤ max
i
vi ≤
∑
i
vi ∈ L1(Θ).
Therefore, by the definition of subgradient, ∫
Θ
g(β, θ)dθ ∈ ∂φ(β).
Clearly, the integral can also be written as an expectation over θ ∼ Unif(Θ), since the probability density of Unif(Θ) is 1µ(Θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ.
A.12 Proof of Lemma 9
The first statement is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.
For the second statement, By Lemma 8 and using the notation there, since g(β, θ) is a subgradient of f(β, θ) (both as
functions of β), taking expectation over θ gives (in this case, µ([0, 1]) = 1 and the probability density is 1 for all θ ∈ [0, 1])
φ′(β) := Eθg(β, θ) ∈ ∂φ(β), ∀β > 0.
In the above, the ith component of φ′(β) is the expectation of the ith component of g(β, θ):
φ′i(β) = Eθ
[
vi∗β,θ (θ)1{i∗β,θ=i}
]
.
For θ ∈ [ak−1, ak], the buyer i∗β,θ is a “winner” on the k-th line segment. Therefore, for θ ∈ [ak−1, ak], we can denote it as the
same buyer i∗k instead (depending on β and k). In this way, the above expectation can be decomposed into sum of integrals over
intervals [ak−1, ak] (if n′ < n, then for k > n′ the interval is empty, on which we can assign an arbitrary winner):
φ′i(β) =
n∑
k=1
∫ ak
ak−1
vi∗k(θ)1{i∗k=i}dθ =
∑
k∈[n]: i∗k=i
(ci∗k
2
(a2k − a2k−1) + di∗k(ak − ak−1)
)
.
By Lemma 7, it takesO(n2) time to find all breakpoints ak, k ∈ [n′] and winners i∗k. Given all ak and i∗k, the above expression
of φ′i(β) clearly takes O(n) time to evaluate. Therefore, computing φ
′(β) takes O(n2) + n ·O(n) = O(n2) time in total.
A.13 Proof of Theorem 5
By Lemma 6, [0, 1] can be partitioned into K ′ ≤ (K−n+ 1) consecutive intervals [sk−1, sk], k ∈ [K ′]. Here, sk only depends
on the input vi. On each interval, all vi are linear. Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 9, we have
φ′(β) =
K′∑
k=1
∫ sk
sk−1
g(β, θ)dθ,
where g(β, θ) is the subgradient of β 7→ maxi βivi(θ). By Lemma 9 (where we take l = sk−1 and u = sk for each k), each
summand
∫ sk
sk−1
g(β, θ)dθ can be computed in O(n2) times. Therefore, φ′(β) can be computed in O(n2K) time.
A.14 Proof of Theorem 6
By Lemma 5, adding the simple “box” constraint β ∈ [
¯
β, β¯], where
¯
βi = 1, β¯i = 1Bi to (3) does not affect the optimal solution
β∗. We will derive all relevant constants under both general Bi and uniform budgets Bi = 1n , with the latter in brackets.
When applying the ellipsoid method to (3) with the added constraint β ∈ [
¯
β, β¯], we need to specify the two oracles. By
Theorem 5, the first-order oracle G takes O(n2K) to compute a subgradient for any input β > 0:
G(β) := φ′(β)−
∑
i
Bi
βi
,
that is, the sum of φ′(β) and the gradient of the second (smooth) part −∑iBi log βi.
Meanwhile, the separation oracle S is trivial due to the simple constraint set. First, normalizing B and computing
¯
βi = and
β¯ take O(n) time. Checking whether β ∈ (
¯
β, β¯) takes O(n) time. If β /∈ (
¯
β, β¯), then along the way we find i such that βi ≤
¯
βi
or βi ≥ β¯i. in the former case, 〈−e(i), β〉 ≥ 〈−e(i), β′〉 for any β′ ∈ [
¯
β, β¯]; in the latter case, use e(i) instead of −e(i) for the
separating hyperplane. The constants R and r in Theorem 4 can be specified as follows.
R = sup
β∈[
¯
β,β¯]
‖β‖ = ‖β¯‖ =
√∑
i
1
B2i
(
=
1√
n
if Bi =
1
n
)
,
r = min
i
(β¯i −
¯
βi) = min
i
1
Bi
− 1 = 1‖B‖∞ − 1
(
= n− 1 if Bi = 1
n
)
.
For the constant V , note that, for any β ∈ [
¯
β, β¯], we have
〈max
i
βivi,1〉 ≤ ‖β‖∞
∑
i
vi(Θ) ≤ n
miniBi
(
= n2
)
.
Therefore,
φ(β) ≤ n
miniBi
−
∑
i
Bi log
¯
βi =
n
miniBi
(
= n2
)
.
Similarly, since βi ≥
¯
βi = 1, we have
〈max
i
βivi,1〉 ≥ 〈max
i
vi,1〉 ≥ min
i
vi(Θ) = 1.
Therefore,
φ(β) ≥ 1−
∑
i
Bi log β¯i = 1 +
∑
i
Bi logBi (1− log n) .
Hence, the constant V can be bounded by
V ≤ n
miniBi
−
∑
i
Bi logBi − 1
(
= n2 + log n− 1 = O(n2)) . (17)
Since ‖B‖1 = 1 and log is concave on R++, we have
−
∑
i
Bi logBi =
∑
i
Bi log
1
Bi
≤ log n. (18)
Meanwhile, nmini Bi ≥ n2, since miniBi ≤ 1n . Therefore, the bound above for V has growth at least Ω(n2). Substituting the
constants R, r, V and using the bound √∑
i
1
B2i
≤
√
n
miniBi
,
we have
N() = O(1)n2 log
(
2 +
V R
r
)
= O
(
n2 log
n ·maxiBi
 ·miniBi
) (
= O
(
n2 log
n

))
.
By Theorem 4, in order to obtain an ′-solution (in terms of objective error) the total time for oracle calls and additional
arithmetic operations is
N(′) ·O(n2K) +O(n2N(′)) = N(′) ·O(n2K) = O
(
n4K log
n ·maxiBi
′ ·miniBi
) (
= O
(
n4K log
n
′
))
.
Since β 7→ −∑iBi log βi is strongly convex with modulus
min
i
Bi
β¯2i
= min
i
B3i
on [
¯
β, β¯], so is the overall objective function of (3). Therefore, to ensure ‖β˜ − β∗‖ ≤ , it suffices to take ′ = 2 · miniB3i .
Substituting it into the above time complexity yields the total time needed to achieve ‖β˜ − β∗‖ ≤ :
O
(
n4K log
n ·maxiBi
 ·miniBi
) (
= O
(
n4K log
n

))
.
A.15 Proof of Theorem 7
The bound on E‖β˜t − β∗‖2 is derived directly from the proof of (Xiao 2010, Corollary 4). Here, the strong convexity modulus
is σ = miniB3i due to the therm β 7→ −
∑
iBi log βi and the domain [
¯
β, β¯].
since β¯i = 1Bi for all i. For the subgradient, we choose g
t = g(βt, θt) = vit(θt) · e(it), where it ∈ arg maxβtivi(θt)
(choosing the smallest index in a tie) based on Lemma 8. Clearly, it depends on both βt and θt. Hence, we have
‖gt‖2 = vit(θt)2 ≤ max
i
vi(θt).
Therefore,
E‖gt‖2 ≤ Eθ[max
i
vi(θ)
2] = G2.
Here, maxi vi ∈ L2(Θ) since
0 ≤ max
i
vi ≤
∑
i
vi ∈ L2(Θ).
The second half is derived in a straightforward manner from the discussion in (Xiao 2010, pp. 2559). Note that ∆t =
G3
2σ (6 + log t) is an upper bound on the regret in iteration t in an online optimization setting (Xiao 2010, §3.2, Eq. (20)).
Meanwhile, the constant V here is an upper bound on the difference between maximum and minimum attainable objective
values of (8) (across all θ ∈ Θ). By (17) and (18) in the proof of Theorem 6, it is bounded by
n
miniBi
−
∑
i
Bi logBi ≤ n
miniBi
+ log n ≤ 2n
miniBi
.
A.16 Proof of Theorem 8
First, each ΘS is (Borel) measurable since it is the preimage of a (Borel) measurable set
{y ∈ Rn : yi = yj > y`, ∀ i, j ∈ S, ` /∈ S} ⊆ Rn
under a continuous function
θ 7→ (β∗1v1(θ), . . . , β∗nvn(θ)) .
Suppose we have solved for b that satisfy the said conditions (we will show that it does exist) and construct x∗i = 1Θi ,
Θi = ∪iΘi,S accordingly. By the choice of S, we know that β∗i vi = p∗ a.e. on ΘS if i ∈ S and β∗i vi < p∗ a.e. on ΘS if i /∈ S.
〈vi, x∗i 〉 =
∑
S
vi(Θi,S) =
∑
S: i∈S
vi(Θi,S) =
∑
S: i∈S
1
β∗i
p∗(Θi,S) =
1
β∗i
∑
S: i∈S
bi,S =
1
β∗i
∑
S
bi,S =
Bi
β∗i
,
that is, (5) holds. Meanwhile, note that
∪S 6=∅ΘS = {θ ∈ Θ : p∗(θ) > 0}.
Therefore, ∑
i
x∗i =
∑
i
∑
S: i∈S
x∗i,S =
∑
S 6=∅
∑
i∈S
1Θi,S =
∑
S 6=∅
1ΘS = 1{p∗>0}.
Hence, (4) clearly holds. By Lemma (4), x∗ solves (1). By Theorem 2, x∗ is an equilibrium allocation. It is a pure allocation by
construction.
Next, we show that such b exists. By Theorem 1 and 2, there exists a pure equilibrium allocation x∗, x∗i = 1Θi , where Θi,
i ∈ [n] is a partition of Θ, that solves (1) and satisfies (4)-(6) together with the optimal solution (p∗, β∗) of (2). Note that these
Θi are potentially different from those constructed in the theorem: for the latter,
∪iΘi = ∪S 6=∅ΘS = Θ \Θ∅,
where Θ∅ is the (possibly nonempty) zero-value subset, on which vi = 0 for all i (and hence p∗(Θ∅) = 0). By Corollary 2,
when i /∈ S, we must have x∗i = 0 a.e. on {p∗ > β∗i vi}, i.e.,
µ(Θi ∩ΘS) = 0.
In other words, in the pure equilibrium allocation x∗, buyer i only chooses from where it wins (i ∈ S). Define
bi,S = 〈p∗, x∗i,S〉,
where x∗i,S = 1Θi∩ΘS is the restriction of x
∗
i on ΘS . We can also write it as bi,S = p
∗(Θi ∩ ΘS). Since p∗ ∈ L1(Θ)+ (c.f.
Lemma 2) and, as a measure, is absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ, we know that bi,S = 0 if i /∈ S. By (4), we also know that on
each ΘS , 〈
p∗,1ΘS −
∑
i
x∗i,S
〉
= 0.
Therefore, for each S 6= ∅, we have∑
i
bi,S =
∑
i∈S
bi,S =
〈
p∗,
∑
i
x∗i,S
〉
= 〈p∗,1ΘS 〉 = p∗(ΘS).
For S = ∅, we have bi,S = 0 for all i and the above equality also holds (this can also been seen from the choice of ΘS , which
ensures p∗ = 0 on ΘS). Meanwhile, since Θi = ∪S (Θi ∩ΘS), we have
∑
S x
∗
i,S = x
∗
i and hence∑
S
bi,S =
∑
S
〈p∗, x∗i,S〉 = 〈p∗, x∗i 〉 = p∗(Θi) = Bi.
where the last equality uses the characterization of p∗ in Theorem 1:
p∗(A) =
∑
i
β∗i vi(A ∩Θi).
The leftover Θ∅ can be assigned arbitrarily since, by its construction, p∗ = vi = 0 a.e. on Θ∅ for all i.
B More details on the illustrative example
Here, n = 4 and the buyers’ budgets are B = (B1, . . . , B4) = [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4]. The valuations are vi(θ) = ci(θ) + di, where
c = (c1, . . . , c4) = [0.0298,−0.0194,−0.0269, 0.011],
d = (d1, . . . , d4) = [0.9851, 1.0097, 1.0135, 0.9945].
The numbers above are randomly chosen and normalized so that vi([0, 1]) =
∫ 1
0
vi(θ)dθ = 1 for all i. Meanwhile, we set
|ci|  |di| so that no two different β˜ivi are nearly parallel. The construction of the breakpoints is straightforward, similar to
the description in the proof of Lemma 9. Let Θ˜i = {p˜ = β˜i} = [li, ui] (i.e., the intervals in the legend of Figure 1, which are
determined by β˜). Use this as a primal solution, an upper bound on the duality gap is(∑
i
β˜ivi(Θ˜i)−
∑
i
Bi log β˜i
)
− C −
∑
i
log vi(Θ˜i),
where C = ‖B‖1 −
∑
iBi logBi and
vi(Θ˜i) =
∫ ui
li
vi(θ)dθ =
ci
2
(u2i − l2i ) + di(ui − li).
After t = 5× 104 SDA iterations, the numerical value of the duality gap is 0.000466. Utility of buyer i is u˜i = vi(Θ˜i), which
is
u˜ = (u˜1, . . . , u˜4) = [0.1031, 0.1816, 0.312, 0.4088].
The (weighted) envy of buyer i is defined as
γi = max
j 6=i
(
Bi
Bj
vi(Θ˜j)− u˜i
)
.
The final {Θ˜i} leads to envy
γ = (γ1, . . . , γ4) = [0.0, 0.0259, 0.0, 0.0017].
